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Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Wilson v. Seiter,1 the United States Supreme Court held that a
prisoner alleging that the prison conditions of his confinement con-
stitute cruel and unusual punishment must show a culpable state of
mind on the part of the prison officials. 2 The Court, applying the
standard announced in Estelle v. Gamble,3 held that deliberate indif-
ference is the appropriate mental standard to apply to an Eighth
Amendment analysis. 4
This Note argues that Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority
opinion for the Court, although logically consistent, based his analy-
sis upon an unwarranted definition of the term prison conditions.
Specifically, Justice Scalia established a dichotomy between the "per
se" imposed sentence and the resulting imprisonment. He stated
that the "per se" sentence carries an intent to punish but that the
resulting imprisonment requires an additional intent to punish on
the part of the prison officials before it can qualify as cruel and unu-
sual punishment. This dichotomy results in an opinion that lends
little guidance to lower courts and will potentially lead to horren-
dous conditions continuing in prisons due to a search for a superflu-
ous intent on the part of prison officials.
This Note also contends that Justice White, in his concurrence,
correctly demanded only an objective Eighth Amendment analysis
for prison conditions cases. He distinguished past Eighth Amend-
ment cases relied upon by the majority by explaining that these
cases were not conditions cases but were the actual sentenced pun-
ishment or allegations that only involved specific acts directed at an
individual, not prison conditions. He correctly asserted that condi-
1 Ill S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
2 Id. at 2326.
3 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
4 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2327.
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tions are themselves part of the sentence and therefore do not re-
quire an additional inquiry into the prison officials intent.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Pearly L. Wilson is a felon incarcerated at the Hocking Correc-
tional Facility (HCF) in Nelsonville, Ohio.5 Wilson complained that
a number of the conditions of his confinement constituted cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 6 In his suit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 19837
against Ohio prison officials, Wilson specifically alleged that im-
proper conditions included overcrowding, excessive noise, insuffi-
cient locker storage space, inadequate heating and cooling,
improper ventilation, unclean and inadequate restrooms, unsanitary
dining facilities and food preparation, and housing with mentally
and physically ill inmates.8 Wilson sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief, as well as $900,000 in compensatory damages. 9
5 Id. at 2322.
6 Id. The Eight Amendment provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST,
amend VIII. The Eighth Amendment is made applicable to the states via the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962).
7 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part: "Every person who, under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
8 Wilson, I11 S. Ct. at 2323. Wilson's complaint alleged that the overcrowding con-
sisted of two inmates in one cell which was less than fifty square feet per person, that the
dormitory was "nearly frigid" in the winter with no provision made for adequate cloth-
ing and during the summer, due to lack of proper ventilation, the temperatures were
excessively high causing difficulty breathing and heat-related rashes. The complaint fur-
ther alleged that the bathrooms were "dirty, slippery, and malodorous" and that the
dining facilities were unsanitary, improperly ventilated with a poor sewage drainage sys-
tem. In addition, the complaint alleged that the prisoners were improperly classified,
thus leading to the presence of physically and mentally ill prisoners in the dormitories
which created a dangerous and stressful environment. Brief of Petitioner, Wilson v.
Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991) (No. 89-7376) at 6. The prison officials' brief alleged that
the prisoners are allowed considerable movement within the prison, the inmates could
choose to watch television or cable television including a movie channel, exercise in the
gym, walk in the yard, play pool, read in the prison library, visit guests in the visitors'
lounge, and attend continuing education classes. The inmates only were required to
report to their bunks only at night and for several periodic counts during the day. In
addition, only older inmates are placed at HCF for their own protection. Brief for Re-
spondents, Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991) (No. 89-7376) at 33, n.l-2.
9 Wilson, I11 S. Ct. at 2323.
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The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.10 Wil-
son, in his supporting affidavit, described the challenged conditions
and charged that after notification, the authorities did not attempt
to remedy the situation. 1 Prison official's supporting affidavits de-
nied the existence of some of the alleged conditions and described
prison officials efforts to improve the others.' 2
In granting respondent's motion for summary judgment, the
District Court found that the Eighth Amendment requires states to
furnish inmates with reasonably adequate food, clothing, shelter,
sanitation, medical care and personal safety. 13 In order to survive a
motion for summary judgment, the District Court required proof
that the conditions of confinement were the result of "obduracy and
wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith" on the part of
the prison officials. 14 The Court held that the alleged conditions
were not the result of obduracy or wantonness on the part of prison
officials. 15 The District Court also dismissed Wilson's claims con-
cerning confinement with physically-ill inmates, cleanliness of lava-
tories, noise levels, heating and cooling, ventilation, eating
conditions and general sanitation based on the strength of contrary
assertions contained in the respondent's affidavits.' 6
Wilson appealed the District Court's decision, claiming the Dis-
trict Court improperly granted the respondent's summary judgment
motion because genuine issues of material fact remained regarding
confinement conditions.' 7 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed the District Court's decision.' 8 The Court of Appeals
agreed with the District Court that Wilson's claims regarding inade-
quate cooling, housing with mentally ill inmates, and overcrowding,
even if true, did not establish constitutionally violative conditions
and therefore, should be dismissed.' 9 As to the remaining allega-
tions, the Court of Appeals held that Wilson's allegations failed to
raise a reasonable inference of obduracy and wantonness which is
marked by persistent malicious cruelty and therefore, there was no




13 Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861, 863 (6th Cir. 1990).




18 Id. at 867.
19 Id. at 865.
20 Id. at 867.
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
the question whether an inmate claiming that the conditions of his
confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment is required to
show that the prison officials possessed a culpable state of mind and
if so, what is the required state of mind.21
III. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority,2 2 Justice Scalia held that prisoners al-
leging that the conditions of their confinement are cruel and unu-
sual in violation of the Eighth Amendment are required to show that
prison officials were deliberately indifferent.23 The Court vacated
the Sixth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for consideration
under this deliberate indifference standard.24
Justice Scalia began his discussion with an examination of pre-
cedent. He noted that the Court in Estelle v. Gamble25 established
the rule that prison conditions which are not specifically part of the
sentence are subject to the cruel and unusual punishment clause of
the Eighth Amendment. 26 He proceeded to examine subsequent
cases of cruel and unusual punishment in conditions cases in order
to determine the appropriate standard for Eighth Amendment scru-
tiny of that which is beyond the sentence itself.27 According to Jus-
tice Scalia, the Court in Estelle relied primarily upon Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber 28 in which the Court held that the Eighth Amend-
ment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause does not forbid sub-
jecting a prisoner to a second electrocution after the first attempt. 29
Justice Scalia pointed out that in Francis, since an "unforeseeable
accident" thwarted the first attempt at electrocution, the officials
lacked the culpable state of mind required to transform the punish-
ment into a violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
21 Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2321-22 (1991).
22 Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ChiefJustice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter joined. Justice White, with whom Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined, concurred in the judgment only.
23 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2327.
24 Id. at 2328.
25 Id. at 2323. Estelle involved an inmates allegations that he received inadequate
medical care and therefore was subject to cruel and unusual punishment. The Court
held that the State has an obligation to provide medical care to it's prison inmates and
that deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the prisoners would consti-
tute an Eighth Amendment violation. 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
26 Wilson, 11 S. Ct. at 2323.
27 Id. at 2323-24.
28 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
29 Wilson, I11 S. Ct. at 2323.
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Clause.30
Next, Justice Scalia examined Rhodes v. Chapman3 1 in which in-
mates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility contended that
double-ceiling (lodging two inmates in one cell) violated the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.3 2 Jus-
tice Scalia conceded that Rhodes focused only on the objective com-
ponent of a cruel and unusual punishment claim but3 3 indicated that
the Court continued to require a subjective component of an Eighth
Amendment violation in the next relevant case, Whitley v. Albers. 3 4 In
Whitley, a prison official's act of shooting a prisoner in the midst of
attempting to quell a riot was not a violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment because "conduct that does not purport to be punishment at
all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the pris-
oner's interest or safety .... It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadver-
tence or error in goodfaith, that characterizes the conduct prohibited by
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause."3 5 Justice Scalia con-
cluded that an objective approach was not sufficient to analyze an
alleged constitutional violation, but rather an inquiry must be made
into the prison officials' state of mind.3 6
According to Justice Scalia not only does precedent demand
such an inquiry into the prison official's state of mind, but an exami-
nation of the Eighth Amendment itself requires such consideration.
Justice Scalia rejected Wilson's and the United States', as amicus
curaie, suggestion that there should be a distinction drawn between
"short-term" or "one-time" conditions (in which a culpable state of
mind is required) and "continuing" or "systematic" conditions (in
which state of mind would be irrelevant). 37 Justice Scalia held that
the intent requirement is not a "whim" of the Court, but rather the
logical interpretation of the Eighth Amendment which bans only
30 Id.
31 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
32 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324. The inmates, in Rhodes, alleged that double-celling was
cruel and unusual punishment because the inmates in the prisons had extended
sentences, the prison was overcrowded, the inmates were forced to share a cell measur-
ing sixty-three square feet although several studies recommend that each inmate have at
least fifty to fifty-five feet of living quarters, that double-ceiling was not a temporary
condition and that the inmates spent a majority of their time in the cell. Rhodes, 452 U.S.
337 (1981).
33 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324.
34 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
35 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2324 (emphasis in the original) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S.
319).
36 Id. at 2324.
37 Id. at 2325.
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cruel and unusual punishment.38 There must be some mental ele-
ment attributable to a prison official before inflicted pain can qualify
as punishment if it is not meted out as punishment for the convicted
offense by either statute or the sentencing judge.39 To illustrate,
Justice Scalia drew on the following statement.40
"The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise
or deter. This is what the word means today; it is what it meant in the
eighteenth century... [I]f [a] guard accidently stepped on [a] pris-
oner's toe and broke it, this would not be punishment in anything re-
motely like the accepted meaning of the word,whether we consult the
usage of 1791, or 1868 or 1985."4 1
Refusing to accept Wilson's suggested short-term versus continuing
conditions distinction in which amici joined, Justice Scalia explained
that although continuing conditions may make it easier to establish
"intent," this is not a logical reason to forgo the requirement of
"intent." 42 In addition, he emphasized that the implementation of a
short term/long term distinction would require an hour-by-hour or
day-by-day differentiation coupled with a categorizing of different
conditions that defy rational implementation.43 Justice Scalia ig-
nored the United States' fear that an intent requirement would al-
low officials to defend Eighth Amendment claims by pleading that,
despite good faith efforts, fiscal constraints beyond the officials con-
trol prevented the elimination of unconstitutional conditions. 44 In
rejecting this policy argument, he stated that "[a]n intent require-
ment is either implicit in the word 'punishment' or is not; it cannot
be alternately required and ignored as policy considerations might
dictate."45
In articulating the appropriate standard for the prison official's
state of mind, Justice Scalia adopted the Estelle standard as opposed
to the Whitley standard concluding that "deliberate indifference," as
articulated in Estelle,46 is the requisite standard to judge prison con-
38 Id. (emphasis in the original).
39 Id. at 2325.
40 Id.
41 Id. (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986)).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 2326.
45 Id. In addition, Justice Scalia noted that a "cost" defense was not offered in this
case and therefore, he would not rule upon the validity of such a defense in a conditions
case. Id..
46 429 U.S. 97 (1976). " 'The State's responsibility to attend to the medical needs of
prisoners does not ordinarily clash with other equally important governmental responsi-
bilities, so that in that context, as Estelle held, 'deliberate indifference' would constitute
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ditions cases. 47 He argued that although the offending conduct
must be wanton, "Whitley makes clear, however, that in this context
wantonness does not have a fixed meaning but must be determined
with due regard for differences in the kind of conduct against which
an Eighth Amendment objection is lodged.' ,,48 Justice Scalia ex-
plained that in Whitley, the Court had found wantonness to consist of
malicious and sadistic action with the purpose of causing harm.49
Attributing the required malicious and sadistic mental state to the
competing governmental responsibilities under such circumstances,
Justice Scalia rejected such a high threshold for allegations of condi-
tions of confinement. 50 Justice Scalia rejected the state's contention
that the wantonness of conduct depends upon the effects of the con-
ditions on the prisoners.51 Instead, he stated that conduct is to be
judged in regard to the constraints officials face. 52 Justice Scalia
stated that food an inmate is fed, the clothes he is issued, the tem-
perature in his cell and his protection against other inmates are all
conditions of an inmate's confinement and no different from the
medical care supplied to him.53 In each of these situations, the
prison officials faced the same constraints. Therefore, the Court
concluded, the Estelle standard of deliberate indifference applied to
providing medical care 54 is appropriate for the furnishing of these
other basic provisions which make up conditions. 55
Justice Scalia discounted Wilson's assertion that Rhodes stood
for the proposition that each condition must be considered in light
of every other challenged condition. 56 He explained that "some
conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment vio-
lation 'in combination' when each would not do so alone, but only
when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the depri-
vation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or
exercise."' 57 There must be an identifiable deprivation of a single,
human need, not an allegation that the "overall" conditions amount
wantonness." Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320
(1986)).
47 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2327.





53 Id. at 2326-27.
54 Id. at 2326.





to a constitutional violation. 58
Justice Scalia concluded that, although it was probably harmless
error, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court's
grant of summary judgment in respondent's favor59 based upon its
use of a "malicious and sadistic cruelty" standard, instead of the
correct "deliberate indifference" standard and therefore, remanded
the case for consideration under the appropriate standard.60
B. JUSTICE WHITE'S CONCURRING OPINION
Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Ste-
vens, concurred only in the decision to vacate the Sixth Circuit's
decision and to remand. Justice White disagreed with the Court's
decision that the decision be viewed under a deliberate indifference
standard, arguing that a subjective intent standard is inappropriate
because past decisions have focused solely upon objective criteria. 61
Justice White agreed with the majority that "pain and suffering
that is part of the punishment imposed on convicted criminals is
subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny without regard to an intent
requirement." 62 Nevertheless, he criticized the majority's assertion
that if the pain and suffering is not expressly due to the punishment
inflicted by statute or the sentencing judge, its constitutionality is to
be determined on the basis of the official's mental state.63 Justice
White argued that the majority's reasoning disregards prior deci-
sions in which the Court has held that the "conditions are them-
selves part of the punishment, even though not specifically 'meted out'
by a statute or judge" 4 and therefore, require only an objective
analysis. 65
Justice White pointed to the first case to address the relation-
58 Id.
59 Id. at 2328.
60 Id. "Conceivably, however, the court would have given further thought to its find-
ing of '[a]t best ... negligence' if it realized that that was not merely an argument a
fortiori, but a determination almost essential to the judgment. Out of an abundance of
caution, we vacate the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and remand the case for reconsider-
ation under the appropriate standard." Id.
61 Id. (White, J., concurring). He stated that "our prior decisions that have involved
challenges to conditions of confinement, where we have made it clear that the conditions
are themselves part of the punishment, even though not specifically 'meted out' by a statute
or judge." Id. (emphasis in the original). Justice White, later in his concurrence, stated
that both Rhodes and Hutto, the only two conditions cases, looked only to objective crite-
ria. Id. at 2328-29. See infra notes 66-71.
62 Id. (White, J., concurring).
63 Id. (White, J., concurring).
64 Id. (White, J., concurring).
65 Id. at 2329-30. (White, J., concurring).
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ship between the Eighth Amendment and conditions of confine-
ment, Hutto v. Finney,66 in which the Court upheld a District Court's
limitation of punitive isolation based solely on objective criteria. 67
Justice White added that Rhode v. Chapman68 squarely resolved the
dispute as to whether conditions of a prison could constitute cruel
and unusual punishment and determined that they could. 69 He said
that "Rhodes makes it crystal clear, therefore, that Eighth Amend-
ment challenges to conditions of confinement are to be treated like
Eighth Amendment challenges to punishment that is 'formally
meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge.' "70
In determining the constitutionality of the conditions in Rhodes, Jus-
tice White said that the Court only looked at the objective severity,
not the intent of the officials. 7 '
In contrast, Justice White posited that the majority mistakenly
relied upon Estelle v. Gamble, Whitley v. Albers, and Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber for the proposition that intent is required to find a
constitutional violation in prison conditions cases. 72 According to
Justice White, in Estelle the challenge was to allegedly inadequate
medical care that one individual received as opposed to a challenge
to medical care in provided in general. 78 Similarly, he asserted that
Whitley did not concern a prison condition but rather a shooting of
an inmate.74 Justice White additionally countered that Francis in-
volved a constitutional challenge to a specific second electrocution
after the first electrocution failed.75 Justice White concluded that
because these cases are not conditions cases, they will not support
the proposition that intent is a requirement for Eighth Amendment
violations in conditions cases. 76
In addition, he indicated that Whitley expressly negates a re-
66 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
67 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2328-29 (White, J., concurring). The majority addressedJus-
tice White's analysis of Hutto and said that the only issue in that case, apart from attor-
ney's fees, addressed "punitive isolation" which inherent in its concept involves punitive
intent. Id, at 2324 n.2.
68 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
69 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2329 (White, J., concurring). The majority said that White's
interpretation of Rhodes was in error because Rhodes simply and only addressed the "dis-
puted" issue of whether "the conditions were a sufficiently serious deprivation to violate
the constitutional standard." Id., at 2325 n.2.
70 Idt at 2329-30 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis in the original).
71 Id. (White, J., concurring).
72 Id. at 2330 (White, J., concurring).
73 Id. (White, J., concurring).
74 Id. (White, J., concurring).
75 Id. at 2330 (White, J., concurring).
76 Id. (White, J., concurring).
1992] 987
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
quirement of subjective intent in conditions cases. 77 "An express
intent to inflict unnecessary pain is not required 78 and harsh 'condi-
tions of confinement' may constitute cruel and unusual punishment unless
such conditions 'are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay
for their offenses against society.' -79 Justice White found that the
majority erroneously interpreted subsequent dictum in Whitley by
characterizing the obdurate and wanton conduct prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment as harsh conditions of confinement instead of
conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all.8 0
Turning from the case law, Justice White argued that the major-
ity's intent requirement does not easily lend itself to practical appli-
cation.8 ' He explained that prison conditions are the result of many
interconnected factors at play over long periods of time. According
to Justice White, the Court offered no guidance as to how to deter-
mine whose intent the Court should examine.8 2 In addition, he ar-
gued that the "deliberate indifference" standard could allow claims
to be dismissed based solely on inadequate funding. 3 Accordingly,
Justice White concluded "serious deprivations of basic human
needs" will be immune from constitutional challenges due to a futile
search for "deliberate indifference" on the part of prison officials.8 4
IV. ANALYSIS
A. THE CASE LAW OF CONDITIONS CASES
Constitutional challenges to prison conditions and the law that
has developed in this area stem from the law regarding Eighth
Amendment challenges to capital punishment. Like so many judi-
cially created tests, in Gregg v. Georgia,8 5 the Supreme Court estab-
lished a two-prong test for determining the constitutionality of
77 Id. (White, J., concurring).
78 Id. (White, J., concurring) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 452 U.S. 312, 347 (1986)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976))).
79 Id at 2330 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Whitley, 452 U.S. at 347 (quoting
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981))).
80 Id. (White, J., concurring). Justice White said that "Itihe majority places great
weight on the subsequent dictum in Whitley that '[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, not
inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterizes the conduct prohibited by the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause ....... Id. at 2330 (White, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319). He criticized the majority's interpretation of conduct as
"harsh 'conditions of confinement' " instead of the proper interpretation of conduct as
"conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all." Id. (White, J., concurring).
81 Id. at 2330. (White, J., concurring).
82 Id. (White, J., concurring).
83 Id. (White, J., concurring).
84 Id. at 2331 (White, J., concurring).
85 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The attempt to
bring clarity to an elusive area of the law resulted in a far from well
articulated test. The Court iterated the test as follows: first, the
Court is required to look to objective criteria that establish contem-
porary values in regard to a challenged sanction,8 6 and second, the
punishment must comport with the "dignity of man"8 7 which the
Gregg court translated to mean that the punishment may not be "ex-
cessive.''88 This second prong requires that the punishment must
not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and the
punishment may not be grossly disproportionate to the severity of
the crime. 9
In Estelle v. Gamble,9° the Supreme Court extended the holding
announced in Gregg and applied the enunciated Eighth Amendment
analysis to the delivery of medical care to an individual prisoner.
The Court explained that the State has an obligation to provide
medical care for its inmates in order to avoid pain and suffering.91
While recognizing that the contemporary values of a maturing soci-
ety as enunciated in Trop v. Dulles92 and Gregg v. Georgia93 still define
the evaluative criteria of a punishment,94 the Court held that delib-
erate indifference to the serious medical needs of the prisoners
would constitute "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" and
hence would violate the Eighth Amendment. 95
In a subsequent prison case, the Court decided the constitu-
tionality of double-celling (two inmates in one cell) in Rhodes v.
Chapman.96 The Court held that double-celling did not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amend-
86 Id. at 173.
87 Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)). The Trop Court held that
"[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity
of man." Trop, 356 U.S at 100. Therefore, the divestment of one's citizenship because of
the act of desertion of the military is unconstitutional since it does not comport with the
dignity of man. Id.
88 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
89 Id. See also, Martin K. Thomas, Note, The Effect of Rhodes v. Chapman on the Prohibition
Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 35 ARK. L. REV. 731 (1982).
90 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
91 Id. at 103.
92 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (punishing a deserter of the military by denying him na-
tionality is cruel and unusual punishment).
93 428 U.S. at 172-173 (punishment of death for the crime of murder does not, under
all circumstances, violate the cruel and unusual punishment standard of the Eighth
Amendment).
94 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102.
95 Id. at 104.
96 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
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ment.97 Again the Court required a showing of unnecessary or wan-
ton infliction of pain or gross disproportionately to the severity of
the crime in order to find a constitutional violation.98 The Court
began to limit itself to the second prong of Gregg by restricting the
weight that the contemporary standard of decency as enunciated in
Trop could have in Eighth Amendment cases by saying that condi-
tions that are not cruel and unusual under contemporary standards
are the price that criminal offenders must pay for their crimes
against society.99
Five years later, in Whitley v. Albers, 00 the Court found that a
prison official's act of shooting an inmate in the leg in an attempt to
quell a prison riot was not cruel and unusual punishment, because
"conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve
more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or
safety." 10 ' The Court stated that, although a constitutional viola-
tion is established if the punishment involves the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain, the conduct needs to be examined with
regard to the differences in the kind of conduct that is allegedly vio-
lative.' 0 2 In Whitley, the Court held that the competing obligations
involved in quelling a prison riot require a different standard than
the deliberate indifference standard which had been used in previ-
ous decisions.10 3 The Court defined the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain as "force... applied.., maliciously and sadistically
for the very purpose of causing harm."' 0 4
B. WHAT ARE PRISON CONDITIONS?
The Court did not expressly state a reason for accepting certio-
rari in Wilson v. Seiter beyond its statement that the case presents the
questions whether an inmate alleging cruel and unusual punishment
in a prison conditions case must show a culpable state of mind and if
so, what is the required state of mind. 10 5 It is not clear that Justice
Scalia was suggesting that this area of the law was already decided
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 347.
100 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
101 Id. at 319.
102 Id. at 320. The Court said that "in making and carrying out decisions involving the
use of force to restore order in the face of a prison disturbance, prison officials undoubt-
edly must take into account the very real threats the unrest presents to the inmates and
prison officials alike, in addition to the possible harms to inmates against whom force
might be used." Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 320-21.
105 Wilson v. Seiter, Ill S. Ct. 2321, 2322 (1991).
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but different views of what constitutes prison conditions would lead
to different conclusions. Like any term in the law prison conditions
is not self-defining. An evaluation of the holding in Wilson therefore
turns on an evaluation of Justice Scalia's and Justice White's defini-
tions of the term "prison conditions." If the term covers any act or
conduct by prison officials in addition to the present existing state of
the prison or its officials which is directed at either an individual or
to the entire prison population, then the majority's opinion is the
proper conclusion. If instead, the term simply refers to the existing
state of the prison in relation to all inmates, then the concurrence's
analysis follows.
For purposes of an Eighth Amendment analysis, Justice Scalia
distinguished the criminal's "per se" sentence from the imposition
of that sentence. Justice Scalia simply stated that "[i]f the pain in-
flicted is not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or sen-
tencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the
inflicting officer before it can qualify."' 06 Although he did not state
what the pain can qualify for, the inference must be drawn from his
analysis that he is characterizing any conduct, act or present existing
state of the prison which is taken after and in response to the im-
posed sentence as all that could qualify as punishment. Justice
Scalia's reasoning appears to progress as follows: the Eighth
Amendment prohibits only cruel and unusual punishment; punish-
ment, by definition, carries an intent to punish; the per se sentence
is punishment because it is intended to punish the criminal after and
in response to his wrongdoing; everything beyond the per se sen-
tence is the prison conditions; but not all prison conditions are pun-
ishment; therefore, in order to be considered punishment and thus
subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny the activity must carry with it
an intent. Presumably, by definition punishment involves an intent
to punish, therefore the sentence imposed on a convicted criminal
certainly involves an intent to punish. But Justice Scalia suggested,
without ever expressly so stating, that pain which results from, but is
not an express part of the sentence does not necessarily involve the
intent to punish. In order to qualify as punishment, there must be
this intent to punish. If Justice Scalia's characterization of prison
conditions is correct, the intent requirement is, at a minimum,
understandable.
At the outset of his analysis in Wilson, Justice Scalia reviewed
Estelle v. Gamble 10 7 in order to invoke the principle that deprivations
106 Id. at 2325 (emphasis in the original).
107 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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which prisoners suffered during imprisonment, but which were not
specifically part of the sentence, are subject to the Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 08 Characteriz-
ing Estelle as a conditions case allowed Justice Scalia to use it to
support his analysis. Estelle involved an inmate's allegations that he
did not receive adequate medical care at the prison.1 09 The concur-
rence pointed out, however that Estelle involved an allegation of
specific conduct directed at one individual and not as a lack of medi-
cal care in general. 110 Justice Scalia responded that "if an individual
is deprived of needed medical treatment, that is a condition of his
confinement, whether or not the deprivation is inflicted on everyone
else." 11 If, as Scalia interpreted it, Estelle is a conditions case, then
it does support his intent requirement, because the Estelle Court
found that there was no constitutional violation because there was
no evidence of deliberate indifference by prison officials to the pris-
oners' needs.' 12
Justice Scalia next examined Rhodes, 113 the double-celling case,
which looked only at objective factors 14 to determine that there was
no constitutional violation. 1 5 He used Whitley to qualify Rhodes's
objective standard.116 According to him, Rhodes did not dismiss
the intent requirement, rather Whitley "made clear" that intent is
still a required element. 117 It is undeniable that Whitley expressly
stated that a negligent omission is not sufficient to establish an
Eighth Amendment violation."18 Instead, the resolution of Whitley
was premised on the prison guard's lack of intent to punish. 119
Shooting the prisoner was obviously not a part of the sentence im-
posed, therefore, according to Justice Scalia, it constitutes condi-
tions of his confinement. But, Justice Scalia's analysis continued,
because the guard did not intend to punish the prisoner, the shoot-
ing could not constitute punishment. It was only Justice Scalia's
characterization of a prison guard's act of shooting a prisoner as a
108 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2323.
109 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98.
110 Wilson, 111 S. Ct at 2330 (White, J., concurring).
II1 Id. at 2325 n.1.
112 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107.
113 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
114 The Court held that double-ceiling the inmates did not violate the constitution
because it did not lead to "inadequate food, medical care or sanitation" within the
prison nor did it lead to an increase in prison violence. Id. at 348.
'15 Wilson, 111 S. Ct at 2324.
116 Id.
'17 Id.
118 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 321, 329 (1986).
''9 Id.
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condition of imprisonment that allowed him to utilize Whitley as sup-
port for his contention.
In contrast, Justice White viewed conditions as "themselves part
of the punishment, even though not specifically meted out by a statute
or a judge." 120 Justice White seemingly implied that conditions to
which a prisoner is subject are an unavoidable result of his sentence.
His analysis distinguished conditions cases from specific acts di-
rected at individual prisoners.1 21 He emphasized that the only con-
ditions cases which the Court analyzed are Hutto V. Finney 122 and
Rhodes v. Chapman.123 According to Justice White, Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber,124 Estelle125 and Whitley 126 each involved chal-
lenges to specific acts directed at individual prisoners and therefore,
were not conditions cases.' 27 Any intent requirement which those
cases required are inapplicable to conditions cases.
Neither definition is logically faulty, but Justice White's concur-
ring opinion did not stretch to define conditions in a manner con-
trary to common sense. Common sense directs that anything that
happens behind those prison bars that pertains to the existing state
of the prison is a condition of the imprisonment. This would in-
clude, for example the size of the cell, food, clothing, general medi-
cal care, and the temperature of the the facilities. In sum, this
translates into everything that the factfinder expects to exist at the
prison when the sentence is imposed. Justice Scalia's definition of
prison conditions defies common sense. He establishes a dichotomy
between the "per se" sentence and everything else which includes
not only the existing state of the prison but everything that happens
behind the prison bars such as shooting an inmate and and individ-
ual's access to medical care. But, his definition includes the caveat
that the "everything else" can only be punishment if it carries an
intent to punish. Although a common sense interpretation is not a
constitutional mandate, when a word is defined in a way that is con-
120 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2328 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis in the original).
121 Id. at 2330. (White, J., concurring).
122 437 U.S. 678 (1978). Hutto involved allegations that the conditions in a prison
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court held that confinement
in a punitive isolation cell for an indeterminate period was not, in and of itself, cruel and
unusual but that the length of punitive isolation in conjunction with a filthy overcrowded
cell, a diet of gruel and the relatively worse condition of the punitive isolation cell in
relation to the prison did constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 867.
123 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
124 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
125 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
126 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
127 Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2330 (1991) (White, J., concurring).
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tradicted by common sense, the conclusion must be reached that the
definer is stretching to reach a predetermined outcome.
The dichotomy established by Justice Scalia in the majority
opinion seems awkward because it appears self-evident that any ac-
tion or conduct taken in response and as a part of the imposed sen-
tence necessarily involves an intent to punish. Justice Scalia said
that "[i]f the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment by
the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element must be attrib-
uted to the inflicting officer before it can qualify."' 28 Justice Scalia
denied the purpose of an imprisonment sentence. It is impossible
to distinguish prison conditions from the sentence. A criminal de-
fendant is sentenced to serve time in a prison. The purpose of im-
prisonment is to punish the convicted for the crime he has
committed. Thus, what the prisoner encounters in the conditions of
his confinement are part and parcel of his sentence. There is no
need to look for an additional intent to punish when considering the
constitutionality of the conditions because the intent to punish has
already been established by virtue of the fact that the criminal has
been sentenced to imprisonment. If the imposed sentence involves
an intent to punish, it necessarily follows that the resulting condi-
tions of that sentence also involve the same intent to punish,
thereby making Justice Scalia's requirement of an additional intent
to punish superfluous and subject to questioning his intentions re-
garding the outcome of the case.
As the concurrence asserted, Whitley, 129 Estelle 130 and Francis 13 1
are distinguishable from both Rhodes 132 and Hutto 133 because prison
conditions are distinguishable from acts or omissions directed at in-
dividual prisoners. 134 Conditions pertain to the present existing
state of the prison, not to an act or omission of an act by an official.
If an act was habitual, it might rise to the level of a condition of a
prison, but, the nature of a specific act is that it occurred once and
thus, hardly seems to qualify as a condition of a prison. Whitley in-
volved the act of a prison official shooting an inmate as he was run-
ning up stairs.135 The purpose of firing was not to punish the
inmate, but rather to protect the guard who was still being held hos-
tage. In Estelle, the inmate's allegation was the failure to provide
128 Id. at 2325 (emphasis in the original).
129 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
130 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
131 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
132 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
133 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
134 Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct 2321, 2330 (1991) (White, J., concurring).
135 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
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adequate medical care to him,13 6 not as an existing condition of the
prison but rather as the omission of a specific duty in one circum-
stance. Both cases involve a specific act or omission of the prison
official, not an existing condition of the prison.
Justice Scalia claims that the Court in Estelle relied heavily on
Francis 13 7 in which the second electrocultion after the first failed was
deemed not to be cruel and unusual punishment. 138 Scalia appears
to be mistaken on that point since Estelle quoted Francis only twice
throughout the whole opinion; once as additional authority for the
proposition that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the "unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain"' 3 9 and a second time to support the
Estelle Court's contention that an "unforeseeable accident" does not
violate the constitution. 140
Even if Scalia were correct, and Estelle did rely on Francis, Fran-
cis is not a conditions case. Francis involved one specific act di-
rected at one specific individual. More importantly, the act of
electrocution is a far cry from the conditions of a prison, rather, it is
the actual sentence which "per se" involves an intent to punish.
Francis is not a prison conditions case and hence, should have no
bearing on Wilson. Justice Scalia's linking of Estelle to Francis sug-
gests that the former, like the latter, is not a conditions cases. Fran-
cis involved an "unforeseeable accident" in that at the time of the
sentencing, the future failure of the electrocution process was un-
known. Likewise, Estelle involved an "unforeseeable accident" in
that the sentencing judge or statute was unaware that the specific
inmate would be hurt and then receive inadequate care. In both
cases, the alleged acts were unforeseeable and not part of the im-
prisonment sentence.
Although the majority does not so concede,' 41 the Rhodes
Court specifically stated that it was addressing for the first time the
applicable standard for prison conditions cases. 142 The Rhodes deci-
sion focused solely upon objective criteria. 143 Given the Court's ex-
planation of what it was doing and the subsequent analysis, we must
136 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
137 Wilson, 11 S. Ct. at 2323.
138 Louisiana ex. rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
139 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (quoting Francis, 329 U.S. at 463).
140 Id. at 105 (quoting Francis).
141 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2325 n.2.
142 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 344-45 (1981). The Court stated "[w]e con-
sider here for the first time the limitation that the Eighth Amendment, which is applica-
ble to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, imposes upon the conditions in
which a State may confine those convicted of crimes." Id.
143 Id. at 346.
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conclude that prison conditions cases are to be decided on the bass
of objective criteria. Likewise, Hutto, a case before Rhodes but also
addressing the constitutionality of punitive isolation, focused on
objective criteria. 144 Justice Scalia said that Hutto focused solely on
objective criteria because punitive isolation necessarily involves an
intent to punish and therefore, its use lends no support to the con-
currence's argument. 45 But, as the concurrence correctly pointed
out, the Hutto Court said "[clonfinement in a prison or in an isolation cell
is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment stan-
dards.' 146 Hence, contrary to Scalia's assertion,147 its objective anal-
ysis is also applicable to conditions in a prison.
In addition to defining prison conditions contrary to common
sense, Justice Scalia formulated a standard for determing whether
conduct is cruel and unusual, that focuses on the wrong party. As
the concurrence stated in Rhodes, "[i]n determining when prison
conditions pass beyond legitimate punishment and become cruel
and unusual, the 'touchstone is the effect upon the imprisoned.' ",148
Justice Scalia additionally asserted that different levels of "wanton-
ness" of conduct are applicable to different situations in the prison.
He said that "the wantonness" of conduct does not depend upon
the effects on the prisoners.' 49 Instead, it depends upon "the con-
straints facing the official."150 Therefore, according to him, we need
only concern ourselves with the prison officials' mental state and the
constraints they face. This is an awkward starting point for an
Eighth Amendment analysis. Punishment which is to be deemed
cruel and unusual should not be dependent upon the prison offi-
cials. It should be completely dependent upon the effects on the
inmates. If, as Justice Scalia said, there must be a determination as
to whether the pain is inflicted with an intent to punish, to deter-
mine whether it is in fact cruel and unusual must rest on whether it
is cruel and unusual in relation to the inmate without any regard to
the official. For example, drawing and quartering a convicted crimi-
nal is cruel and unusual because it is an excessive punishment which
does not comport with the dignity of man, not because of any sadis-
tic intent on the part of the executioner.
144 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87. (1978).
145 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2325 n.2.
146 Id. at 2329 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis in the original) (quoting Hutto, 437
U.S. at 685).
147 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2325 n.2.
148 Rhodes v. Chapman, 352 U.S. 337, 364 (1981) (J. Brennan, concurring) (quoting
Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F.Supp. 269, 323 (D.N.H. 1977)).
149 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326.
150 Id. (emphasis in the original).
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Justice Scalia's opinion also paves the way for an economic de-
fense which should have no bearing on whether punishment is cruel
and unusual. Although Justice Scalia claimed that the Court did not
rule upon the validity of a lack of resources defense, 5 1 he implicitly
ruled upon it. As the concurrence correctly pointed out, fiscal re-
straints on the part of the prison officials will defeat any allegation
of an Eighth Amendment violation. 152 Lack of resources is a very
real constraint which prison officials face. It is beyond their control
and thus, implicates no intent to mete out punishment. No matter
how minimal the level of subjective intent required, a lack of re-
sources to improve a prison is the ultimate impossibility to improve-
ments. For example, if an inmate alleges a lack of food provisions,
the prison officials can constitutionally defeat the inmate's allega-
tion by asserting their own lack of resources.
The lack of resources defense could be disastrous for both par-
ties involved in an alleged Eighth Amendment violation. 153 If a con-
stitutional violation is avoided for lack of resources, the prison
officials will be unable to increase the funds allotted to them by the
legislature who distributes the money. The prisoner, too is no bet-
ter off because he continues to be subject to the poor conditions.
This creates not only the possibility, but the probability that
deplorable prison conditions will continue to exist with no end in
sight only because of a lack of resources. Under Justice Scalia's
analysis, neither party wins.
It is the legislature's responsibility to allot funds to the state
prisons. Although, society's values are the province of the legisla-
ture, 154 it is the Court's duty to curb unconstitutional legislative
acts. If horrendous prison conditions cannot be remedied due to a
lack of funds and the Court has implicitly ruled that this is a valid
defense, there never will be an improvement in conditions.
Although the judicial branch must be wary of "overstepping" its
bounds into the legislature's role, the judiciary is the only solution
that inmates possess. The judiciary has a duty to curb unconstitu-
151 Id.
152 Id at 2330 (White, J., concurring).
153 In addition, a valid cost defense could be detrimental not only to inmates but also
to the prison officials themselves. Prisons have only a finite amount of resources. If a
constitutional violation could be found that was due to lack of resources and the cost
defense was not valid, the State might be forced to increase the money allotted to a
prison, thereby granting prison officials more money, personnel and resources which
could also make the officials' jobs easier. Jeff Bleich, The Politics of Prison Crowding, 77
CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1127 (1989).
154 The Court in Gregg said that "the constitutional test is intertwined with an assess-
ment of contemporary standards and the legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascer-
taining such standards." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1975).
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tional legislative activities. AsJustice Brennan said in his concurring
opinion in Rhodes, "[t]here is no reason of comity, judicial restraint,
or recognition of expertise for courts to defer to negligent omis-
sions of officials who lack the resources or motivation to operate
prisons within the limits of decency. '"155
The question remains as to what an appropriate standard for
conditions cases could be. Justice White merely alluded to the ap-
propriate standard in a prison conditions case. He stated that "pain
or other suffering that is part of the punishment imposed on con-
victed criminals is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny without
regard to an intent requirement."'' 56 He then asserted that the con-
ditions are part of the punishment, 57 thereby implicitly stating that
all condition cases require an analysis which ignores subjective in-
tent. Although Justice White never expressly states what is the ap-
propriate Eighth Amendment test, he implicitly promotes a
completely objective analysis. This assumption is easy to make due
to Justice White's reliance upon Rhodes which demonstrated that the
appropriate Eighth Amendment analysis is an objective
determination.
Justice White ends his concurring opinion by stating "[tihe ulti-
mate result of today's decision, I fear, is that 'serious deprivations of
basic human needs' 58 will go unredressed due to an unnecessary
and meaningless search for 'deliberate indifference.' "159 Again, his
immediate worry seems to be the deprivation of basic human needs
which could reasonably be the touchstone of an Eighth Amendment
analysis.
The Court has held that conditions which do not deprive an
inmate of essential food, medical care or sanitation are not an
Eighth Amendment violation.160 An affirmative duty to provide the
necessary human needs that is not qualified by a search for a subjec-
tive intent on the part of the prison officials is a standard that will
provide superior guidance to lower courts than the standard set
forth in Wilson. As the Court said in Rhodes, "'Eighth Amendment
judgements should neither be nor appear to be merely the subjec-
tive views' ofjudges."16t Solely objective standards will provide for
155 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 362 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
156 Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2328 (White, J., concurring).
157 Id. at 2328 (White, J., concurring).
158 Id. at 2331 (J. White concurring) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347)).
159 Id. at 2331 (J. White, concurring).
160 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981).
161 Id. at 346 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275 (1980)).
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an analysis that is not the subjective views of judges and hence a
"better" constitutional interpretation.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision requiring that an inmate show deliberate
indifference on the part of the prison officials is both unneeded and
unwarranted by past Eighth Amendment cases. The imprisonment
sentence is impossible to distinguish from the actual imprisonment.
Requiring an additional subjective intent will allow a myriad of de-
fenses to an alleged Eighth Amendment violation, most importantly
an economic defense. Since the judiciary is often the only savior for
inmates, the majority opinion paves the way for grossly inadequate
prison conditions to go unredressed. The Court's opinion also pro-
vides little guidance to lower courts in terms of who's subjective in-
tent is at issue.
More importantly, the Court relied upon past Eighth Amend-
ment cases that did not involve prison conditions. The Court de-
nied the explicit holding of Rhodes to create a new standard for
conditions cases. The Court expanded the common sense definition
of the term "conditions" to include specific acts or omissions di-
rected at individual prisoners in order to utilize past case law in sup-
port for its outcome.
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